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INTRODUCTION
With the stroke of two pens, the fight was over.1 The Standing Rock
Sioux, a federally recognized Indian tribe in North Dakota2 fought the
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (“DAPL”) to protect its reser-
vation lands and people.3 On November 1, 2016, after months of pro-
tests, supported by environmental and civil rights groups, the Tribe won
a small victory: the Obama administration urged consideration of a rer-
oute of the pipeline4 and for Energy Transfer Partners (“ETP”), the com-
pany behind DAPL, to cease its construction of the pipeline pending
further consultation.5 On January 18, 2017, the Army Corps of Engineers
considered drafting an environmental impact statement to further investi-
gate ways to protect the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe from the DAPL.6
Then, the unexpected happened: on January 24, 2017, President
Donald J. Trump signed an executive order authorizing the construction
of the DAPL.7 On February 22, 2017, police executed North Dakota
Governor Doug Burgman’s emergency evacuation order, arresting
protesters who had not already left the camp site at Oceti Sakowin.8 Af-
1 Jeremy Diamond, Athena Jones, and Gregory Krieg, Trump Advances Controversial Pipe-
line with Executive Action, CNN (Jan. 24, 2017, 05:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/
politics/trump-keystone-xl-dakota-access-pipelines-executive-actions/.; Alene Tchekmedyian, 10 Ar-
rested as Authorities Close in on Dakota Access Pipeline Protest Camp, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017,
7:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-dakota-access-protest-camp-20170222-
story.html.
2 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 12 (D.D.C.
2016).
3 History, STAND WITH STANDING ROCK, http://standwithstandingrock.net (last visited Mar. 8,
2018).
4 Caitlyn Yilek, Obama: We’re Examining Options to Re-Route ND Pipeline, THE HILL,
(Nov. 1, 2016, 11:23 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/energy-environment/303912-
obama-were-examining-ways-to-reroute-the-nd.
5 Wes Enzinna, Army Halts Construction of Dakota Access Pipeline, MOTHER JONES (Nov.
15, 2016, 9:09 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/11/army-corps-dakota-access-
pipeline-trump/.
6 Army Department, Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement in Con-
nection With Dakota Access, LLC’s Request for an Easement To Cross Lake Oahe, North Dakota,
FED. REG. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/18/2017-00937/no-
tice-of-intent-to-prepare-an-environmental-impact-statement-in-connection-with-dakota-access-llcs.
7 Diamond et al., supra note 1.
8 Tchekmedyian, supra note 1. Oceti Sakowin is a historic camp for the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe. Throughout the centuries, tribal leaders and supporters have gathered at Oceti Sakowin to
protest and conduct prayer services for the tribe and its people. This site holds a special importance
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ter months of protesting and over two years of opposition to the pipeline,
two pens defeated it all.9
The environmental issues raised by the DAPL are intertwined with
tribal sovereignty and tribal consultation.10 The Standing Rock Sioux ad-
vocated for improved tribal consultation and protections for its reserva-
tion lands and people, in part, because it feared that an oil pipeline could
irreparably damage its water supply.11 Mni Wiconi; water is life.12 Until
tribal sovereignty concerns are addressed, the environmental harms and
issues raised by the DAPL will continue to occur and harm American
Indian tribes. The DAPL raises concerns about tribal sovereignty in the
twenty-first century and provides an opportunity for the United States to
re-examine this issue in a way that protects the welfare and safety of
tribal peoples and lands. The fight is over and the DAPL is a reality.
However, by not addressing the issue of tribal sovereignty, the United
States will continue to harm Indian tribes and erode their tribal sover-
eignty even more over time.13 Protests garner attention, but only changes
in policy and jurisprudence can establish permanent protections.
Historically, Indian treaties provided the greatest protections for In-
dian tribes.14 The executive branch negotiated formal treaties with Indian
tribes, the legislative branch ratified these agreements and the judicial
branch interpreted treaty provisions.15 Courts gave treaties great defer-
ence and, when invoked, courts were reluctant to toss aside treaty provi-
sions.16 This system, by judicial precedent, protected Indian tribes and
codified many sovereign rights, including certain water and land rights.17
to the Standing Rock Sioux tribe. See generally STAND WITH STANDING ROCK, http://standwithstand-
ingrock.net/oceti-sakowin/Oceti Sakowin (last accessed Feb. 13, 2018).
9 Diamond, et al., supra note 1; Tchekmedyian, supra note 1.
10 Kate Harris and Michael Gonchar, Battle Over an Oil Pipeline: Teaching About the Stand-
ing Rock Sioux Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/learn-
ing/lesson-plans/battle-over-an-oil-pipeline-teaching-about-the-standing-rock-sioux-
protests.html?_r=0.
11 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7 (D.D.C.
2016).
12 Dakota Access Pipeline Standoff: Mni Wiconi, Water is Life, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
(Aug. 16, 2016), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/native-news/dakota-access-pipeline-
standoff-mni-wiconi-water-is-life/.
13 Hope E. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the
Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005
Utah L. Rev. 443, 460-63 (2005); see generally South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993)
(holding that land rights can be abrogated by implication).
14 See generally Winters v. United States 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (water rights); see generally
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (land rights).
15 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986).
16 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986).
17 See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (water rights); South Dakota
v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (land rights).
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However, this treaty-based system has not been revisited in nearly two
centuries.18 Congress ended the treaty system in an appropriations bill in
1871, creating the present statutory system.19
The current system uses a statutory framework to regulate formal
relations with Indian tribes, relying heavily on Congressional legislation,
executive orders, and a narrow interpretation of treaty provisions in the
judicial system.20 This system is one-sided and does not protect tribal
sovereignty. Congress can enact statutes with little or no input from In-
dian tribes.21 Even Congressional legislation aimed to protect Indian
tribes only protects Indian tribes from certain federal action and is silent
when private conduct affects tribal lands.22 The executive branch, acting
through executive orders, creates uncertainty in the government’s rela-
tions with Indian tribes since administrations can change every four
years.23 Lastly, in recent years, the judicial branch has not asserted its
historic role in protecting Indian tribal rights.24 The Court once was the
forum to uphold treaty obligations and provide expansive protections for
tribes. Today, courts have been hesitant to broadly interpret treaty provi-
sions, and instead narrowly interpret congressional legislation to the det-
riment of Indian tribes.25 The only way to protect Indian tribal
sovereignty in the twenty-first century is to reinstate a treaty-based sys-
tem so that the broad protections that treaties once gave Indian tribes are
redrafted in a twenty-first century context.
This article explores tribal sovereignty through the lens of the Stand-
ing Rock Sioux and its opposition to the DAPL. The DAPL situation is a
symptom of the larger problem of a lack of tribal consultation, which
diminishes tribal sovereignty and tribal rights.26 The current system re-
18 See generally Babcock, supra note 13, at 457.
19 25 U.S.C. § 71.
20 See generally South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (finding that congressional
legislation extinguished treaty rights by implication and narrow application of past treaty interpreta-
tion tenants).
21 See generally MICHAEL LAWSON, DAMMED INDIANS: THE PICK SLOAN PLAN AND THE MIS-
SOURI RIVER SIOUX 1944-1980 (U. Okla. Press, 1st ed. 1982) (arguing that the Pick Sloan Agree-
ment proceeded without adequate consultation with affected Indian tribes).
22 See generally Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 stat. 887 (codified in
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.), https://www.usbr.gov/power/legislation/fldcntra.pdf.
23 See Diamond, et al., supra note 1.
24 See generally Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (finding that congressional legislation extinguished
treaty rights by implication and narrow application of past treaty interpretation tenants).
25 See generally id. (finding that congressional legislation extinguished treaty rights by impli-
cation and narrow application of past treaty interpretation tenants). The notion of broad interpreta-
tion of treaty rights will be discussed in more detail in Part I.
26 See LAWSON, supra note 21; see also Babcock, supra note 13, at 462.
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lies on Congressional statutes,27 narrow interpretation of treaty rights,
and executive orders, leaving Indian tribes with few ways to protect their
tribal sovereignty and ensure adequate consultation with the federal gov-
ernment and other organizations in the twenty-first century.
Part I discusses the history of tribal sovereignty through an explana-
tion of the domestic dependent status of Indian tribes and the two historic
canons of Indian treaty interpretation. The Court’s interpretation and ap-
plication of these canons in the cases of Winters,28 Dion,29 and Bour-
land30 have a direct relation to the amount of protection given to Indian
tribes.
Part II provides a brief history of the Fort Laramie Treaty31 that
created the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation and a factual background
for the DAPL protests and legal battles. Part III then proposes the revital-
ization of a treaty-based system for U.S.-Indian relations and outlines
how a treaty might be drafted, using the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous People (“UNDRIP”)32 as a framework. It then
discusses the benefits of a treaty-based system to Indian tribes and how
each branch of government would be involved in this new treaty-based
system.
I. INDIAN TREATY INTERPRETATION
A. DOMESTIC DEPENDENT STATUS OF TRIBES
Indian tribes, as domestic dependent nations, have a unique relation-
ship with the United States government.33 Indian tribes maintain certain
sovereign rights but are also subject to the will of the government and
rely on it for certain protections.34 Chief Justice John Marshall, in Chero-
kee Nation v. Georgia,35 referred to tribes as domestic dependent nations
because they were neither foreign nations nor states.36 Since the Com-
merce Clause provides Congress with the authority to “regulate com-
27 See Nat’l Hist. Land Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. 300101 et seq. (2014). These statutes, like
the National Historic Land Preservation Act, were written to ensure adequate consultation with In-
dian tribes. The National Historic Land Preservation Act is outside the scope of this Comment.
28 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
29 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S 734 (1986).
30 South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
31 Fort Laramie Treaty, Sioux-U.S., Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 636.
32 G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (Sept. 13,
2007), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.
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merce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes,” there is a clear differentiation between foreign nations, states,
and Indian tribes; therefore, each group should have a distinct relation-
ship with the United States federal government.37
Furthermore, unlike foreign nations, Indian tribes do not hold an ab-
solute sovereign right to their land.38 Despite retaining some sovereignty
to defined lands,39 they are subject to the will of the United States since
they rely on the United States for protection and their territory composes
a part of the United States.40 The founders intended a unique relationship
with the Indian tribes and this was codified in the Constitution.41
B. TREATY RIGHTS: THE JUDICIARY’S KEY ROLE IN INTERPRETATION
Treaties protect Indian tribes and acknowledge their domestic de-
pendent status.42 Indian tribes retain certain sovereign rights and cede
certain rights to the United States.43 Treaties and their historic interpreta-
tion ensure that this balance is maintained.44 Judicial interpretation of
treaty provisions provides expansive protections for Indian tribes that go
beyond the express language of a treaty, interpreting treaty provisions in
a way that is most favorable to the Indian tribe.45 At the same time,
Congress can abrogate46 certain treaty rights when they “clearly and
plainly” pass legislation that annuls a past treaty provision.47 Broad inter-
pretation of treaty rights does not limit Congressional authority to act.48
Instead, treaty interpretation asks Congress to deliberate and come to a
reasoned conclusion before a treaty provision is abrogated.
The judicial branch is essential to the protection of tribal sovereignty
and tribal rights.49 The legislative and executive branches are not consis-
tent and change over time.50 On the other hand, the judicial branch can
37 Id. at 18.
38 Id. at 17.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 20.
41 See id.
42 See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
43 See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
44 See generally United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-40 (1986).
45 See generally Winters, 207 U.S. 564.
46 To abrogate is to “abolish by authoritative action” or to “treat as nonexistent.” Abrogate,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abrogate (last visited Mar. 8,
2018).
47 See Dion, 476 U.S. at 738-40 (explicating the clear and plain interpretation doctrine).
48 See id.
49 See generally Winters, 207 U.S. 564 (holding that water rights were implied in a treaty
even though they were not in the language of the treaty).
50 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 4; U.S. CONST., amend. XXII.
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protect tribal rights over time through legal precedent.51 However, since
the treaty system has not been revisited or revised in over two centuries,
this historic protection has been limited and Indian tribes have not re-
ceived adequate protections.52
C. HISTORIC CANONS OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
The domestic dependent status of Indian tribes led to the adoption of
a treaty-based system.53 Unlike states, Indian tribes were not formally a
part of the United States at its founding and held certain sovereign
rights.54 Since Indian tribes had no formal relationship with the United
States, a treaty-based system was necessary.55 Indian treaties established
tribal reservations and outlined the negotiated rights and benefits that
both the United States and Indian tribes enjoyed.56
Early Supreme Court jurisprudence balanced the sovereign interests
of Indian tribes against the ability of the federal government to exert
control over the United States and the several Indian tribes.57 Histori-
cally, courts utilized two treaty interpretation canons to ensure this bal-
ance: (1) interpret treaty rights in a way that is most advantageous to
Indian tribes,58 and (2) be explicit in modifying or abrogating treaty
rights.59 To abrogate a treaty right, Congress must demonstrate, through
express statutory language or legislative history, that Congress specifi-
cally considered the effect its legislation would have on Indian tribes and
nonetheless abrogated said treaty right.60 These two treaty interpretation
canons gave protections to Indian tribes while also protecting Congress’
ability to enact legislation.61
1. Winters v. United States: A Broad Interpretation of Treaty Rights
The first canon of Indian treaty interpretation is interpreting the
treaty in a light most favorable to the Indian tribe.62 In some circum-
51 See generally Winters, 207 U.S. 564; see generally Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391
U.S. 404 (1968) (holding that certain hunting rights were preserved by an Indian Tribe who had
ceased to be recognized by the U.S. government).
52 See generally Babcock, supra note 13, at 463.
53 See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
54 See generally Babcock, supra note 13, at 459-60.
55 See generally id. at 457.
56 See generally id. at 464.
57 See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
58 Id. at 576.
59 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986).
60 Id.
61 See generally id. at 738-39.
62 Id. at 740.
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stances, an active judiciary can infer tribal rights not expressly codified
in a treaty.63 For example, in Winters v. United States, the Supreme
Court established water diversion rights for Indian tribes through a broad
interpretation of an Indian treaty.64
In Winters, the United States sued five defendants on behalf of the
Crow Indian Tribe,65 under an 1888 treaty to enjoin the defendants from
diverting water from the Milk River.66 The 1888 treaty established the
Fort Belknap reservation, but did not have specific language regarding
tribal water diversion rights,67 or the right to divert a certain amount of
flowing water for the purpose of irrigation or another reservation need.68
The issue before the Court was whether a treaty that did not expressly
grant water diversion rights, gave such rights to an Indian tribe.69
The Supreme Court found for the United States and established tri-
bal water diversion rights for Indian tribes.70 The Court concluded that
since the United States forced Indian tribes to occupy reservations, the
federal government needed to protect certain tribal water rights.71 Prior
to reservations, Indian tribes were nomadic and hunting communities.72
Focusing on these origins, the Court reasoned that since the Indian Tribes
did not readily exercise their rights to water, the United States govern-
ment exercised these rights for them in order to direct the Indian tribes to
adopt an agrarian way of life on reservations.73 This new way of life
required a stable water supply and the United States needed to protect
this water supply on behalf of the Crow Tribe.74
The Court applied the first canon of treaty interpretation and re-
solved the ambiguity of water rights in a light that was most favorable to
the Crow Tribe.75 The Court looked to the circumstances surrounding the
63 See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908).
64 See id. (inferring reserved water rights to the Crow Indian Tribe).
65 The Crow Indian Tribe are a federally recognized Indian tribe that is located in Montana.
They have a long history in the Yellowstone River Valley and were widely recognized for their
matriarchal society where women held significant positions of power within the tribe. See generally
Crow Indians, INDIANS.ORG, http://indians.org/articles/crow-indians.html (last accessed Feb. 13,
2018).
66 See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. The Milk River is a tributary of the Missouri River and spans
over 729 miles in length, spanning much of the state of Montana. See generally Feature Detail
Report for: Milk River, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERV., https://geonames.usgs.gov/apex/f?p=gnispq:3:0::
NO::P3_FID:774213 (last accessed Feb. 13, 2018).
67 See Winters, 207 U.S. at 575-76.
68 Id. at 576.
69 Id. at 577.
70 Id. at 576.
71 Id.
72 See id.
73 Id. at 575-76.
74 Id. at 576.
75 Id.
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol48/iss2/8
2018] Unseen Harm: U.S.-Indian Relations & Tribal Sovereignty 193
1888 agreement and decided that the Tribe would not have relinquished
all water rights at the time of this treaty.76 An Indian reservation located
on arid land was valueless and uninhabitable without a stable water sup-
ply.77 The Tribe enjoyed and used a larger area of land before negotiat-
ing the treaty,78 but nevertheless, entered into an agreement which
limited its land use to a smaller tract of land.79 The Court reasoned that
the Crow Tribe would not have entered the 1888 agreement if the tribe
believed it would be unable to access the Milk River and its water sup-
ply.80 Therefore, the 1888 agreement was written under the assumption
that the Crow Tribe would have broad control over the water diversion of
the Milk River, even though these water rights were not stated explicitly
in the treaty.81
2. United States v. Dion: Congressional Abrogation of Treaty Rights
The second canon of treaty interpretation is that Congress must ex-
plicitly modify and abrogate treaty obligations.82 The rationale for this
canon is that treaties should be given deference and not cast aside with-
out deliberation.83 In United States v. Dion, the Court applied this canon
to the abrogation of a past treaty provision that allowed Indian tribes to
sacrifice bald eagles for ceremonial purposes.84 The issue was whether
the Bald Eagle Protection Act, which banned the killing of bald eagles,
abrogated a past treaty provision which allowed for the Yankton Sioux
Tribe85 to hunt bald eagles for non-commercial purposes.86
The Court held that Congress abrogated a treaty provision that al-
lowed for the ritual sacrifice of bald eagles by enacting the Bald Eagle
Protection Act.87 Justice Marshall reiterated the long-standing legal stan-
76 Id. at 575-76.
77 Id. at 576.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 576-77.
80 Id. at 575-76.
81 Id. at 576.
82 See generally United States v. Dion 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 736-37.
85 The Yankton Sioux are a sub group of the Sioux Nation. The tribe would sacrifice bald
eagles and use their feathers for certain rituals and ceremonies. See generally LAWSON, supra note
21. See also Henry J. Reske, Lawyers Tell High Court Indian Treaty Allows Eagle Hunting, UNITED
PRESS INT’L (Mar. 26, 1986), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/03/26/Lawyer-tells-high-court-In-
dian-treaty-allows-eagle-hunting/6054512197200/; see also Dion, 476 U.S. at 741-42 (explaining
how amendments and legislative action over time demonstrated that Congress considered the ramifi-
cations the act would have on Indian tribes).
86 Dion, 476 U.S. at 736.
87 Id.
9
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dard of explicit abrogation of treaty provisions and that “an act of Con-
gress, passed in the exercise of its constitutional authority . . . if clear and
explicit, must be upheld by the courts . . . .”88 Specific statutory language
and legislative history demonstrated that Congress considered the tribes
when enacting the Bald Eagle Protection Act, and after deliberation, de-
cided to abrogate a treaty provision.89
The power to abrogate treaty provisions is significant but not with-
out limits.90 Congress should demonstrate deliberation and thought be-
hind abrogating a treaty provision and specifically consider the effect
their actions would have on Indian tribes.91 At the same time, Congress
cannot be blocked from abrogating treaty provisions should circum-
stances or the interests of the United States change over time.92 This
interpretive canon strikes a necessary balance to protect Indian tribes and
allows Congress to act in the best interests of the United States.93
3. South Dakota v. Bourland: Departure from Historic Canons of
Treaty Interpretation
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has shifted considerably from
the above mentioned canons of treaty interpretation.94 Specifically, the
Court has held that the effect of a statute can abrogate a treaty provision
rather than requiring express language or legislative history to abrogate
the provision.95 In South Dakota v. Bourland, the Court held that the
Flood Control Act of 1944 and the Cheyenne River Act abrogated a past
treaty provision through its effect on the disputed land, not the language
or legislative history of the statutes.96
The Bourland Court considered whether the Flood Control Act of
1944 and the Cheyenne River Act abrogated a Fort Laramie Treaty right,
which gave considerable tribal authority over the use of the lands along
Lake Oahe,97 a reservoir that was created after the Flood Control Act of
88 Id. at 738.
89 Id. at 740-41.
90 See generally id.
91 See generally id. at 738-39.
92 See generally id.
93 See generally id.
94 See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1993).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 697-98.
97 Id. at 681-82, 688 (holding that Article 2 of the Fort Laramie Treaty gave absolute use and
occupation to the Sioux Nation of their reservation lands, the implicit power to exclude others from
reservation areas, and regulate use of fishing land along the reservation).
10
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1944.98 Before the enactment of the Flood Control Act and the Cheyenne
River Act, the land in question was part of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Indian Reservation, and the Fort Laramie Treaty gave considerable con-
trol over the land to the tribes for hunting and grazing.99 After the enact-
ment of these statutes, the land was flooded and certain hunting, timber
salvaging, and fishing rights were given to the Cheyenne River Tribe.100
The Bourland Court considered whether the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe
could restrict the use of the shoreline along Lake Oahe to Indian tribal
use only and exclude non-Indian hunters and fisherman by not recogniz-
ing South Dakota State fishing and hunting licenses.101
The Court found that the Flood Control Act extinguished previous
treaty obligations since it gave enforcement authority to the Army Corps
of Engineers and diminished some regulatory authority from the Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribe.102 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, con-
cluded that the Flood Control Act and Cheyenne River Act clearly and
expressly abrogated previous treaty rights.103 By building a dam, all past
rights were no longer in force “regardless of whether land is conveyed
pursuant to an Act of Congress for the homesteading or for flood control
purposes.”104 This decision gave broad deference to Congress to extin-
guish Indian treaty rights and found that congressional statutes can abro-
gate treaty obligations by effect, even without specific legislative
language or legislative history that abrogates a treaty right.105
The Supreme Court was not unanimous in its interpretation of the
clear and plain abrogation doctrine.106 In a spirited dissent, Justice
Blackmun articulated the historic treaty interpretation canon.107 He
noted, “Tribes possess ‘inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which
has never been extinguished.’”108 Blackmun reasoned that just because
the United States government wished to build a dam, that does not mean
that it wished, or intended, to extinguish all treaty rights and authority
over the land that it took for the construction of a dam.109 Congress
98 See generally LAWSON, supra note 21. The Flood Control Act and Cheyenne River Act
designed to reclaim land from the Sioux Tribe for the purpose of controlling the flow of the Missouri
River and developing water projects along the Missouri River. Id.
99 Fort Laramie Treaty, Sioux-U.S., art. 2, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 636.
100 Bourland, 508 U.S. at 683-84.
101 Id. at 685.
102 Id. at 696.
103 Id. at 687, 694.
104 Id. at 689, 692.
105 Id. at 692-94.
106 See id. at 698 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 698-99.
108 Id. at 699 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (emphasis
omitted)).
109 Id. at 698.
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needed to make clear that it wished to extinguish all hunting and fishing
authority over the land taken for the dam project in order for a treaty
right—tribal authority over use of fishing lands—to be extinguished.110
Blackmun argued that the Tribe retained its rights under the Fort Laramie
Treaty because the United States did not demonstrate the requisite clear
showing.111
D. TREATY INTERPRETATION: THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
The precedents set in Winters112 and Dion113 demonstrate that the
historic canons of treaty interpretation provide a system that protects In-
dian tribes and the federal government’s ability to adapt and change over
time. Treaties should be interpreted in a way that is most advantageous to
the Indian tribes.114 Indian tribes are unique as domestic dependent na-
tions and therefore, their relationships with the United States government
must necessarily be different than those of a state or foreign nation.115
Indian tribes are protected when treaty ambiguities are resolved to their
benefit. Also, there should be a clear and plain abrogation of treaty
rights.116 Congressional abrogation is permissible but historically has
been narrowly defined by the above-mentioned standards.117 Congress is
not hindered by enacting legislation and treaties do not hinder Congres-
sional ability to abrogate treaty provisions, if necessary.118 Express lan-
guage and legislative history that demonstrates a consideration of past
treaty obligations is enough to justify abrogation of treaty rights.119
These canons of treaty interpretation have not been applied by the
Supreme Court in recent years. The Bourland decision demonstrates that,
without these canons, Indian tribal sovereignty and tribal treaty rights are
less protected.120 With outdated treaties and a broad interpretation of the
abrogation of treaty provisions, Indian tribes are at the mercy of Con-
gressional legislation. By not adhering to the historic canons of treaty
interpretation and the treaty-based system, tribal sovereignty and, conse-
quently, tribal consultation are eroded and Indian tribes have limited
110 Id. at 700.
111 Id.
112 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
113 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1986).
114 Bourland, 508 U.S. at 699 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115 See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
116 See generally Dion, 476 U.S. 734; Winters, 207 U.S. 564.
117 See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576; Dion, 476 U.S. at 738, 740.
118 See generally Dion, 476 U.S. 734.
119 Bourland, 508 U.S. at 692-94.
120 See id. at 692-94.
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ways to protect their sovereign rights. It is in this context that the Stand-
ing Rock Sioux sought legal recourse.121
II. BACKGROUND: THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX AND THE DAPL
The Standing Rock Sioux trace its treaty rights to the Fort Laramie
Treaty of 1868.122 The Fort Laramie Treaty created a formal relationship
between the Sioux Tribe and the United States, establishing certain reser-
vation lands.123 The Sioux were a nomadic tribe that traversed vast
stretches of the Midwest.124 The Fort Laramie Treaty restricted its land
holdings, but granted exclusive dominion over its granted area of land,
also known as unceded territory.125 The Sioux were allowed to control its
reservation land, those who settled in it, and had broad hunting, fishing,
and irrigation rights.”126 Furthermore, its land holdings could not be
changed or taken away without consent of three-fourths of adult males of
the tribe.127
The Fort Laramie Treaty created certain benefits for the tribes and
certain benefits for the government.128 For example, while the United
States agreed to build certain structures on Indian reservation land, the
Indian tribes agreed to allow the United States to construct a national
railroad without interference.129 In exchange for the construction of the
railroad, some of which would cross and affect tribal land, the govern-
ment would provide just compensation for the harms done by this pro-
ject.130 While the treaty gave certain Indian Tribal lands, the 5th
Amendment provided that just compensation must be given for any land
taken by the U.S.131
A central aspect of the Fort Laramie Treaty is just compensation for
actions affecting tribal land or traversing tribal land.132 In fact, just com-
121 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 12-17
(D.D.C. 2016) (factual background to permitting and consultation process).
122 See generally LAWSON, supra note 21.
123 See generally id. (The Sioux Tribe has since developed into several distinct groups includ-
ing the Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, Fort Belknap, Brule and Yankton Sioux Tribes).
124 See id.
125 Fort Laramie Treaty, Sioux-U.S., art. 2, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 636.
126 Id. at arts. 2, 8-9, 16.
127 Id. at art. 12.
128 See id. at arts. 2, 11.
129 Id. at arts. 4, 11.
130 See id. at arts. 2, 11; U.S. CONST., amend. V.
131 See Fort Laramie Treaty, Sioux-U.S., art. 2, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 636; U.S. CONST.,
amend. V.
132 See Fort Laramie Treaty, Sioux-U.S., art. 2, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 636; U.S. CONST.,
amend. V. Part III will further explain that this notion of just compensation should apply to a modern
treaty. The Fort Laramie Treaty considered the effect of projects on tribal land. Id. In the twenty-first
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pensation underlies the entire treaty.133 The United States explicitly
agreed to give the Tribe goods and build certain institutions and struc-
tures within the reservation in exchange for non-interference with a na-
tional railroad.134
Moving to the present day, the route of the DAPL was not always an
issue for Energy Transfer Partners (“ETP”) and the Standing Rock
Sioux.135 In fact, early proposed routes show plans for a route through
Bismarck, North Dakota as early as May 2014, five months before the
route through Lake Oahe was submitted.136 The pipeline was redirected
towards Indian tribal land when residents of Bismarck were concerned
about the effect the pipeline could have on their water supply.137 The
route that affected Bismarck, which was ten miles north of the city, was
determined to be a high consequence area, meaning that the water supply
of Bismarck was highly likely to be significantly affected by an oil
pipeline.138
The Standing Rock Sioux have confronted the DAPL route for over
two years.139 In September 2014, ETP announced its plan to cross the
Missouri River under Lake Oahe at the confluence140 of the Missouri and
Cannonball River.141 This location is a half-mile north of the Standing
Rock Sioux Reservation.142 The DAPL crosses dozens of rivers and
water crossings along its nearly 1200 mile route.143 In December 2014,
ETP submitted its proposed route to the Army Corps of Engineers for
century, tribal land is affected in ways that could not have been conceived in the nineteenth century,
namely that water resources could be polluted by an underground oil pipeline. Part III will contend
that a new treaty system, based on the historical principles of past treaties, should adopt a similar
approach in a twenty-first century context.
133 See generally Fort Laramie Treaty, Sioux-U.S. .
134 Id. at arts. 4, 8, 10-11.
135 See Amy Dalrymple, Pipeline Route Plan First Called for Crossing North of Bismarck,






139 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 13 (D.D.C.
2016). For more detailed information on the permitting process and a breakdown of the consultation
efforts behind the proposed pipeline route. See id. at 12-24.
140 A confluence is “the place of meeting of two streams.” Confluence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/confluence (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
141 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 14.
142 Id. at 13.
143 Gregor Aisch & K.K. Rebecca Lai, The Conflicts Along 1,172 Miles of the Dakota Access
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/23/us/dakota-
access-pipeline-protest-map.html.
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol48/iss2/8
2018] Unseen Harm: U.S.-Indian Relations & Tribal Sovereignty 199
consideration.144 The Army Corps then authorized the construction of the
pipeline through a standard permit, which allows for construction
through federally regulated waters.145
Federal permitting was a small part of the DAPL and its construction
proceeded without significant federal oversight.146 With the exception of
the crossing at Lake Oahe that came close to the Standing Rock Sioux
Reservation, ninety-nine percent of the pipeline traversed private land.147
Therefore, as long as ETP obtained the consent and permission of private
landowners for easements through its respective properties, the DAPL
was nearly guaranteed to become a reality.148 The only places that re-
quired permitting were along Lake Oahe and the confluence of the Mis-
souri and Cannonball rivers, which are federally regulated waterways.149
In March 2016, Iowa was the last state to approve the DAPL.150 Just
a month later, protesters gathered in North Dakota to protest the
DAPL.151 The Army Corps of Engineers granted over 200 permits to
cross through federally regulated waterways in July 2016, paving the
way for the DAPL.152
The Army Corps of Engineers arrived late to the negotiation process
between ETP and the affected tribes, including the Standing Rock
Sioux.153 The Army Corps had little involvement with the early pipeline
route negotiations and took a more extensive role almost a year after the
initial discussions and inspections of the land.154
The Standing Rock Sioux sought a temporary restraining order to
block the pipeline in the Federal District Court for the District of Colum-
bia under the National Historic Preservation Act.155 Protests were ongo-
ing and several interests groups supported the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
and its fight against the pipeline.156 The lawsuit had many causes of ac-
144 James Hill & Dean Schabner, Timeline of Dakota Access Pipeline Development, ABC
NEWS (Feb. 12, 2017, 12:57 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/standing-rock-sioux-court-halt-dakota-
access-pipeline/story?id=45432998.





150 Hill & Schabner, supra note 144.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 4, 14 (D.D.C.
2016). The factual basis behind the National Historic Preservation Act and the permitting timeline is
beyond the scope of this article. However, see generally id. at 8-10, 12-26 (providing an extensive
discussion of the permitting timeline in the Factual findings of the opinion).
154 Id. at 14-15.
155 Id. at 25-26.
156 Hill & Schabner, supra note 144.
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tion, including claims under the National Environmental Policy Act,
Clean Water Act and the National Historic Preservation Act.157 The or-
der was denied by the District of Columbia District Court on September
9, 2016.158
After the court’s decision, President Obama urged ETP to cease con-
struction efforts voluntarily for the DAPL while the Army Corps consid-
ered alternative routes and consulted with the Standing Rock Sioux and
other affected tribes.159 In January of 2017, the Army Corps decided it
would implement an environmental impact study (“EIS”) and was al-
lowed to proceed with this study after a federal judge denied a motion to
stop this EIS.160 On January 24, 2017, President Trump signed an execu-
tive order that rescinded this study and began construction of the pipe-
line.161 In February 2017, the Army Corps pulled its EIS and granted the
final easement for the DAPL.162 Then, on February 9, 2017, the Chey-
enne River Sioux, with support from the Standing Rock Sioux, filed suit
to challenge this final easement.163 The federal district court denied the
Cheyenne River Sioux’s suit.164 As of June 9, 2017, oil is now flowing
through the DAPL.165
III. SOLUTION: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TREATY SYSTEM
The current statutory system that regulates U.S.-Tribal relations is
inadequate to protect Indian tribal rights in the twenty-first century.166
Our current system allows both the executive branch and legislative
branch to act on their own initiative and does not incentivize either
branch to consult or negotiate with Indian tribes.167 The executive branch
can sign executive orders without input from Indian tribes and Congress
157 See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 7-12.
158 Hill & Schabner, supra note 144.
159 Enzinna, supra note 5.
160 Hill & Schabner, supra note 144.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.; Blake Nicholson, Judge Combines 4 Tribal Suits Over Dakota Access Pipeline, DESE-
RET NEWS (Mar. 17, 2017, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/765693349/Judge-com-
bines-4-tribal-suits-over-Dakota-Access-pipeline.html.
164 U.S. Judge Denies Tribe’s Request to Stop Oil Flow in Dakota Access Pipeline, REUTERS
(Mar. 14, 2017, 4:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-dakota-pipeline/u-s-judge-de-
nies-tribes-request-to-stop-oil-flow-in-dakota-access-pipeline-idUSKBN16L2U0.
165 Robinson Meyer, Oil is Flowing Through the Dakota Access Pipeline, THE ATLANTIC,
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/06/oil-is-flowing-through-the-da-
kota-access-pipeline/529707/.
166 See generally Babcock, supra note 13, at 462-464; LAWSON, supra note 21.
167 LAWSON, supra note 21.
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can enact legislation without tribal consultation.168 This leaves no incen-
tive for tribal consultation and harms tribal sovereignty over land and
other resources.169
A treaty-based system encourages negotiation and consultation with
Indian tribes. The executive branch has power over foreign affairs.170 By
negotiating a treaty, the executive branch must negotiate with the Indian
tribe and come to an agreement.171 Then, the executive branch must elicit
support from Congress to ratify the negotiated treaty.172 Ultimately,
under the historic canons of treaty interpretation, Congress would need to
consider the interests of a tribe before abrogating a treaty provision that
was negotiated by the President.173
A treaty-based system protects Indian tribes and does not hinder the
federal government’s ability to act.174 This system fosters separation of
powers amongst all branches of government, cooperation amongst the
executive and legislative branches and promotes Indian tribes as domes-
tic dependent sovereigns that retain certain sovereign rights.175
Without a treaty-based system, the historic separation of powers be-
tween the executive branch and legislative branch has been eradicated.176
By ending the treaty system, Congress took away the historic power of
the executive branch to negotiate foreign affairs.177 This gives Congress
plenary power to enact legislation and, consequently, diminishes the sov-
ereignty of Indian tribes and the protections and rights they had under
negotiated treaties.178
Treaties provide lasting protections for tribal sovereignty and tribal
rights.179 Even today, Indian tribes receive considerable protection from
treaties180 and the judicial branch has consistently shown deference to
treaties and tribal rights, such as water diversion rights.181 However,
168 See generally Babcock, supra note 13, at 462-463; see generally South Dakota v. Bour-
land, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
169 See generally Babcock, supra note 13, at 463; see generally Bourland, 508 U.S. 679.
170 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1-2.
171 Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1069, 1100 (2004).
172 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1-2.
173 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-40 (1986).
174 Babcock, supra note 13, at 459-60.
175 Id. at 463.
176 See Prakash, supra note 171, at 1097 (concluding that a treaty-based system gave certain
powers to the President and certain powers to Congress where each did not have unlimited or ple-
nary power over federal Indian relations).
177 Id. at 1101.
178 Id. at 1099.
179 See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 574 (1908); see generally Menominee
Tribe v. United States 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
180 See U.S. DEP’T. OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
181 See generally Winters, 207 U.S. 574.
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these protections are outdated and do not address the current situation of
Indian tribes in the twenty-first century, such as underground pipelines
and large private domestic oil projects. Treaties, such as the Fort Laramie
Treaty, do not address these new developments, specifically the potential
environmental hazards of underground pipelines, because they were not
in these past agreements and cannot be inferred since they were not a
part of nineteenth century America.
A new treaty with the Indian tribes will benefit the tribes and not
harm the United States. A new treaty and the process behind its negotia-
tion would provide a much-needed dialogue regarding twenty-first cen-
tury Indian relations and confront the new problems facing Indian tribes
today. The treaty will provide an opportunity to expand Indian tribal
rights that will protect Indian tribes in the twenty-first century. Further, a
treaty system will not significantly affect the federal government. Adopt-
ing a treaty system will require clear deliberation in treaty abrogation and
will allow the United States to modify treaties as necessary. By consult-
ing with tribes and negotiating a new treaty, the federal government will
create a better relationship with Indian tribes and create a consistent pol-
icy towards Indian tribes for the twenty-first century.
A treaty system will bring all three branches of government together
and will bring cohesion and consistency to tribal relations. The executive
branch and its agencies would be able to negotiate treaties with Indian
tribes, based on the particularized concerns and needs of each tribe. The
legislative branch would implement and ratify the treaty negotiated by
the executive branch. This would provide oversight of the President’s
negotiations and would provide a framework for the legislative branch to
codify in law, if necessary. Finally, the judicial branch would protect
Indian tribes from encroachment by the legislative and executive
branches. It would interpret treaties broadly and resolve disputes in a
light most favorable to Indian tribes and determine whether Congress did
its due diligence and considered the Indian tribes before abrogating a
specific treaty provision. Again, abrogation could be accomplished
through the express language of a statute or the legislative history and
discussions behind a given statute.
A. UNITED NATIONS: AN EXAMPLE OF A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
TREATY
While a treaty-based system has not been revisited in the United
States for centuries, the United Nations has done considerable work in
18
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drafting and executing treaties over the past decades.182 The United Na-
tions has provided a framework and examples of how a twenty-first cen-
tury treaty might be drafted and what would be important in such a
document. Specifically, the United Nations Declaration of Rights of In-
digenous People (“UNDRIP”)183 provides key principles that should be
considered in the drafting of a new treaty.
The UNDRIP outlines the importance of recognizing the culture of
indigenous people and the right to certain basic rights, including rights to
sustainable living, to be free from harassment and other protections for
natural resources.184 Currently, there are 144 signatories with only four
countries, Australia, the United States, Canada and New Zealand, re-
jecting this agreement.185 In fact, the countries that reject the UNDRIP
have significant indigenous populations, more so than the countries who
are signatories to the agreement.186
An overarching principle of UNDRIP is the free, prior and informed
consent of indigenous people before taking action against indigenous re-
sources and lands.187 Several articles of UNDRIP mention free, prior and
informed consent in the context of land, natural resources and environ-
mental protections.188 Furthermore, UNDRIP gives a right to redress for
just, fair and equitable compensation for resources that are used or dam-
aged without free prior informed consent.189 This provides an important
safe guard for indigenous people should there be no fair, prior and in-
formed consultation.190
The UNDRIP sheds light on the meaning of free, prior and informed
consent.191 UNDRIP encourages states to implement obligations to con-
sult and cooperate with indigenous people.192 The UNDRIP sees consul-
tation and cooperation as essential elements to improved relations with
indigenous people.193 Furthermore, UNDRIP recognizes treaties and
agreements with indigenous people and hopes to strengthen partnerships




185 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, DIV. FOR SOC. POLICY AND DEV.:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-
rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html.
186 See generally The Indigenous World, INT’L WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS,
https://www.iwgia.org/en/indigenous-world.
187 G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 182, at art. 10.
188 Id. at arts. 10, 11, 19, 28, 29.
189 Id. at arts. 8(2), 11(2), 20(2), 28, 32(3).
190 G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 182, at art. 37.
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with them and allow indigenous people to practice their own self-deter-
mination.194 In short, nations should not take action that affects an indig-
enous people without adequate consultation or their free, prior and
informed consent.
B. WHAT WOULD A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TREATY IN THE U.S.
LOOK LIKE?
A treaty between the United States and Indian tribes would be com-
plex and specific to each tribe. However, any treaty should have two
overarching principles and provisions: (1) free, prior and informed con-
sent and (2) just compensation.
Free, prior and informed consent establishes a basis for improved
consultation with Indian tribes. Free means that Indian tribes are not
forced into negotiating or compelled to accept a particular agreement or
project.195 Prior means that the consultation occurs before a project is
undertaken.196 Informed means that the tribes understand all of the rele-
vant facts and circumstances and are able to make a reasoned conclu-
sion.197 Admittedly, free, prior and informed consent does not guarantee
a beneficial outcome for Indian Tribes. In fact, by negotiating a new
Indian treaty, both sides will not get everything that they might want out
of it.198 That being said, both would leave with assurances and benefits
from the negotiated treaty. For example, consider the following treaty
provision:
The protection of Tribal water resources is of utmost importance to
tribal self-sufficiency. In order to protect these rights and the health of
Indian tribes, any action that threatens to harm tribal water resources
will not take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the
Indian tribes. Should termination or re-route of potential projects not
be feasible, just compensation will be provided to the Indian tribes,
such that they are adequately compensated for harms that might occur
in the future as a result of those projects.
The above stated provision exemplifies free, prior, and informed
consent, or meaningful consultation with Indian tribes. It urges parties to
negotiate in good faith and each seek benefits for themselves. Only
through cooperation and meaningful dialogue can the United States gov-
194 Id.
195 See id., at art. 2.
196 See id., at art. 30.
197 See id., at art. 28.
198 See id., at art. 38.
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ernment and Indian tribes establish relationships that give both protec-
tions to Indian tribes and flexibility to the United States to act in its own
interest.199
In addition, just compensation should be a part of a new treaty sys-
tem. As discussed above, the Fort Laramie Treaty allowed for just com-
pensation, which guaranteed compensation for activity that affected
Sioux Reservation land.200 Not only does just compensation provide a
benefit to the Indian tribes, it also exemplifies free, prior and informed
consent.201 Just compensation implies a prior agreement that was freely
negotiated by the Indian tribes. Also, just compensation is informed be-
cause both parties provide evidence as to the amount of compensation
that would be justified in a particular instance.
Current treaties are inadequate to provide just compensation for In-
dian tribes in the twenty-first century. Unlike the negotiation of the Fort
Laramie Treaty, the economy has changed and the effect that certain ac-
tivities have on reservations has changed.202 Unlike a train that cuts
through reservation land and physically alters the land, underground
pipelines can affect the water supply of Indian reservations, even though
they might not actually be built on or under reservation land or cross its
land holding.
Just compensation is essential to providing some benefits to Indian
tribes that are affected by potential environmental hazards. Just compen-
sation could come in many forms, such as a direct payment to the Indian
tribe when a construction project would affect the reservation, a govern-
ment sponsored or a privately executed insurance policy, or a trust fund
to be used in case of catastrophic harm to reservation land. For instance,
if an Indian tribe finds that an oil pipeline might harm its water supply, it
could negotiate direct compensation for this potential hardship or an in-
surance policy that protects the tribe from future pollution. The insurance
policy would guarantee that should a pipeline adversely harm a tribal
water source, the policy would pay cover certain costs, namely clean-up
costs, compensation for displacement or other harms suffered by the
tribe, with limited and narrowly focused litigation, if any.
199 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986).
200 See Fort Laramie Treaty, Sioux-U.S., art. 2, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 636; U.S. CONST.,
amend. V.
201 See G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 182, at art. 28; see also U.S. CONST., amend. V.
202 See G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 182, at annex.
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CONCLUSION
A treaty-based system would provide the protection that Indian
tribes need in the twenty-first century. Developments in technology, such
as oil pipelines, bring new concerns and potential harms to Indian tribes.
By reinstituting a treaty-based system, the United States government,
through its three branches, would work in concert and ensure trans-
parency and consistency in their relations with Indian tribes. Further-
more, tribes will be protected and the United States will not be impeded
from enacting legislation by a treaty-based system. This new system will
make the United States stronger and ensure the protection of Indian
tribes in the twenty-first century.
Relations with Indian tribes have a checkered past and some tribal
rights have been eroded over time.203 The DAPL issue has brought this
situation into the national spotlight and demonstrates how there are sig-
nificant problems that Indian tribes face in the twenty-first century. Tri-
bal sovereignty will continue to be eroded until meaningful negotiations
are undertaken and a new treaty-based system is implemented. The judi-
cial branch and the interpretation of treaty rights is the only meaningful
and consistent protection that Indian tribes can count on. Furthermore,
the historic canons of treaty interpretation provide a balance that is es-
sential to the protection of Indian tribes and the effective action of the
United States government. Only by revisiting a treaty-based system can
Indian tribes hope to reclaim historic protections that they once held.
While the DAPL is a reality and oil will continue to flow through it, the
issue and its national spotlight provides a significant opportunity for In-
dian tribes and the United States to revisit U.S.- Indian relations. We
must seize the attention given to this issue and use it to bring meaningful
protections to Indian tribes. We must not forget. Mni Waconi. Water is
life.
203 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 736, 740-41 (1986); South Dakota v. Bourland,
508 U.S. 679, 687, 694, 696 (1993).
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